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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: CIEC
SUBJECT: G-8 MEETING, MARCH 2

1. SUMMARY: ON MARCH 2 CIEC G-8 HEARD UNDER SECRETARY
DESIGNATE COOPER DESCRIBE CURRENT STATE OF USG THINKING

ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. THIS PRESENTATION WAS VERY FAVORABLY RECEIVED. EC REVIEWED THEIR DECISION-MAKING SCHEDULE FOR SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. GROUP AUTHORIZED CANADIAN CO-CHAIRMAN TO PUT FORWARD FOLLOWING CIEC TIME-TABLE WITH PEREZ-GUERRERO IN CARACAS ON MARCH 7: CIEC TO BE RELAUNCHED IN LATE APRIL (AT LOWER LEVEL THAN SENIOR OFFICIALS, A POINT EXPECTED TO BE HIGHLY CONTENTIOUS), ORGANIZATION OF SUBSEQUENT WORK TO INVOLVE EXISTING COMMISSIONS; SENIOR OFFICIALS MEETING NOT TO BE EXCLUDED PROVIDED IT COMES IMMEDIATELY BEFORE CONCLUDING MINISTERIAL WHICH WOULD BE PROPOSED (IF EC AGREES TO RESCHEDULE A COUNCIL) FOR MAY 30/31. GROUP ALSO AGREED THAT CANADIANS WOULD HAVE WIDE FLEXIBILITY IN WORKING OUT DETAILS, ALTHOUGH G-8 WOULD HAVE LAST WORD IN RATIFYING ARRANGEMENTS. G-8 TENTATIVELY AGREED TO MEET AGAIN ON APRIL 6 IN PARIS. END SUMMARY.

2. MEETING WAS WELL ORGANIZED BY CANADIANS AND MOVED RAPIDLY THROUGH CURRENT STATE OF PLAY TO EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON SUBSTANCE AND THEN ON QUESTIONS OF STRATEGY OF TIMING STRATEGY AND TIMING.

3. COOPER OPENED BY SAYING HE WOULD REPORT THE POSITION OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATION, SUCH AS IT HAD BEEN DETERMINED SO FAR, ON CIEC ISSUES. HE CAUTIONED, HOWEVER, THAT THE NEW ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY REVIEW WAS NOT YET OVER: NORTH/SOUTH ISSUES HAD NOT YET BEEN DISCUSSED AT THE CABINET LEVEL, NOR HAD PRESIDENT CONFIDENTIAL

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CARTER FOCUSED ON THEM. THE DEADLINE FOR FINALIZING THE POLICY REVIEW ON NORTH/SOUTH MATTERS WAS MARCH 7, WHEN THEY WOULD BE EXAMINED AT CABINET LEVEL. MR. COOPER THEN TURNED TO THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES AS OUTLINED ON THE AGENDA PREPARED BY THE CANADIANS: (1) TRANSFER OF RESOURCES, (2) COMMODITIES AND (3) ENERGY.

4. ON TRANSFER OF RESOURCES ISSUE, COOPER SAID DISPOSITION IN WASHINGTON WAS TO GO AHEAD WITH A FULL IDA V REPLENISHMENT ALONG THE LINES OF THE CURRENT SCHEDULE. HE CAUTIONED, HOWEVER, THAT HE DID NOT FEEL THAT THE U.S. WOULD BE ABLE TO INCREASE ITS IDA V CONTRIBUTION BEYOND AMOUNTS NOW BEING DISCUSSED. HE REGRETTED THAT THE U.S. WAS IN ARREARAGES ON IDA IV, BUT U.S. ADMINISTRATION HOPED TO CORRECT THIS BY THE END OF THE YEAR. WITH REGARD TO ODA, THE U.S. WAS VERY MUCH DISPOSED TO A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN ITS BILATERAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (THOUGH IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE NOW TO DEFINE

PRECISELY QUOTE SUBSTANTIAL UNQUOTE).

5. COOPER SAID THE NEW ADMINISTRATION TOOK THE PROBLEM OF LDC DEBT RELIEF VERY SERIOUSLY. IN LATE 1974 AND 1975 IN RESPONSE TO THE OIL PRICE INCREASE AND ECONOMIC DOWNTURN, MANY LDC COUNTRIES BORROWED QUITE HEAVILY ABROAD, GAMBLING THAT THE RECESSION WOULD BE SHORT AND SHALLOW. IT WAS A RATIONAL GAMBLE BUT THEY HAD LOST. IT WAS IN NO ONE'S INTEREST THAT THESE COUNTRIES NOW EXPERIENCE THE WORLD RECESSION WITH A

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THREE YEAR LAG.HENCE IT WAS COOPER'S INCLINATION -
SHARED BY THE TREASURY - TO BE FORTHCOMING IN AN EFFORT
TO TIDY-UP THIS LDC DEBT PROBLEM. HE NOTED, HOWEVER,
THAT THE REAL DEBT PROBLEM WAS NOT WITH THE POOREST
COUNTRIES, THOUGH HE UNDERSTOOD THAT IT WAS THE DEMAND
OF THE POOREST COUNTRIES FOR GENERALIZED DEBT RELIEF
THAT HAD ARISEN AS A MAJOR POLITICAL ISSUE IN CIEC.
IN HIS VIEW, THE PROBLEM OF THESE COUNTRIES WAS NOT
DEBT; WHAT THE POOREST COUNTRIES NEEDED MOST WAS
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE THROUGH GRANTS OR LOANS ON
VERY EASY TERMS. HE WISHED TO UNDERLINE, THEN, THAT
THERE WAS A DISJUNCTURE BETWEEN THE TRUE DEBT PROBLEM
AND THE DEBT PROBLEM AS IT HAD BEEN PRESENTED IN CIEC.

6. ON COMMODITIES COOPER FELT THAT THERE WAS SCOPE
FOR REAL GAIN HERE BOTH BY DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES. ALL HAD AN INTEREST IN AVERTING THE WIDE
PRICE FLUCTUATIONS EXPERIENCED IN 1972-1975. US DOES
NOT SEE COMMODITY AGREEMENTS, HOWEVER, AS A MEANS TO
TRANSFER RESOURCES, AND THEREFORE THE OBJECTIVE IN
WORKING OUT COMMODITY AGREEMENTS IS TO STABILIZE PRICES
BUT NOT TO RAISE THEM ABOVE MARKET TRENDS. WITH
RESPECT TO A QUOTE COMMON FUND UNQUOTE, MR. COOPER
NOTED THERE ARE POTENTIAL ECONOMIC BENEFITS TO BE
GAINED BY COMBINING THE FINANCIAL RESOURCES OF INDI-
VIDUAL BUFFER STOCKS ONCE THESE ARE FORMED IN ORDER
TO PERMIT LENDING FROM ONE FUND TO ANOTHER. CONCEIV-
ABLY WE COULD ENVISION AN OVERDRAFT FACILITY TO SUPPLE-
MENT THIS POOL OF FUNDS FOR LENDING TO BUFFER STOCKS
UNDER SPECIAL CONDITIONS IN EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES
WHEN ALL BUFFER STOCKS WOULD SIMULTANEOUSLY NEED EXTRA
FUNDS SUCH AS BUST CYCLE OF 1975. THIS APPROACH COULD
BE VIEWED AS A VARIANT OF THE FOURCADE PROPOSAL. IN
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ANY EVENT, THE COMMON FUND WOULD HAVE TO BE QUITE DIFFERENT FROM THAT NOW ENVISAGED BY THE UNCTAD SECRETARIAT. COOPER CAUTIONED THAT IT WOULD BE POLITICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE U.S. TO COMMIT ANY MONEY TO AN UNCTAD FUND WITHOUT KNOWING WHAT THE MONEY WOULD BE USED FOR.

7. THE LONG TERM PROBLEM OF DEVELOPING NEW RESOURCES WAS ALSO IMPORTANT. COOPER DREW ATTENTION TO THE

PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WHICH DEPEND ON ONLY ONE OR TWO COMMODITIES FOR EXPORT EARNINGS. HE SAID THAT AN EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO INVOLVE THE WORLD BANK MORE IN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT. COOPER ADDED THAT WE COULD SEE A POSSIBLE LINK ON THE MANAGERIAL LEVEL - BUT NOT ON THE FINANCIAL LEVEL - BETWEEN THE POOLING OF COMMODITY STOCK FUNDS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW RESOURCES.

8. REGARDING ENERGY, MR. COOPER ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE U.S. WAS A VERY HIGH ENERGY USER. HE RECALLED THAT IN YEARS PAST THE U.S. HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO DEVELOP AN ENERGY POLICY, BUT NOW FORMER DEFENSE SECRETARY SCHLESINGER HAD BEEN CHARGED WITH THIS AND HE WAS UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO PROVIDE A DRAFT ENERGY PROPOSAL TO THE PRESIDENT BY MID-APRIL. MR. SCHLESINGER'S PRELIMINARY THINKING ON AN ENERGY PROGRAM WAS THAT IT WOULD ENCOMPASS BOTH RESTRICTING CONSUMPTION BY NON-MARKET MEASURES AND DEVELOPING ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF SUPPLY. WITH REGARD TO CIEC, MR. COOPER THOUGHT THAT THE CREATION OF A CONTINUING FORUM FOR EXCHANGES OF VIEWS BETWEEN PRODUCERS AND CONSUMERS WOULD BE DESIRABLE. ALSO, THE OIL-IMPORTING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES SHOULD BE ASSISTED - BOTH TECHNOLOGICALLY AND FINANCIALLY - IN DEVELOPING ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF ENERGY.

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9. BUTLER (EC) SAID EC POSITIONS ON SUBSTANCE WOULD BE DECIDED BY APRIL 5 EC FOREIGN MINISTERS COUNCIL. EC WANTED TO COORDINATE WITH G-8 IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER. HE WELCOMED COOPER STATEMENT ON NEW U.S. THINKING. HE SAID G-8 WOULD HAVE TO SHOW SOME ADVANCE ON PREVIOUS POSITIONS. ON TRANSFER OF RESOURCES AND DEBT, DIFFERENCES STILL REMAINED WITHIN EC AND IT WAS TOO EARLY TO SUGGEST EC POSITION. HE NOTED COOPER STATEMENT ON THESE ISSUES WENT BEYOND EARLIER U.S. POSITIONS. ON COMMODITIES EC WAS WORKING HARD ON OPENING POSITION FOR COMMON FUND MEETING. POSITION WOULD BE DECIDED BY

MARCH 8 EC COUNCIL. EC WISHED TO TAKE A POSITIVE
APPROACH BASED ON PRICE STABILIZATION. HE NOTED WITH
INTEREST COOPER REFERENCE TO QUOTE CLEARING HOUSE UN-
QUOTE AND QUOTE OVERDRAFT UNQUOTE POSSIBILITIES. EC

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HOPED TO GET DOWN TO CONSTRUCTIVE NEGOTIATIONS AND
AVOID ARGUMENTS WITH G-19 OVER PRINCIPLE.

10. MIYAZAKI (JAPAN) WELCOMED COOPER AND EC STATE-
MENTS. NEW IDEAS RAISED BY COOPER WOULD BE CAREFULLY
STUDIED IN TOKYO BY NEW JAPANESE ADMINISTRATION WHICH
WAS ALSO DEVELOPING ITS POSITION. ON ENERGY, HE AGREED
WITH COOPER THAT ONGOING CONTACT BETWEEN PRODUCERS AND
CONSUMERS WOULD BE NEEDED. HE STRESSED NEED FOR CLOSE
G-8 COOPERATION SAYING JAPANESE WOULD INFORM G-8 PART-
NERS AS SOON AS IT DECIDED ON POSITIONS AND ASKED
OTHERS TO DO THE SAME.

11. JOLLES (SWITZERLAND) REGRETTED SWISS INABILITY TO
PARTICIPATE IN IDA OR INCREASED ODA BECAUSE OF ADVERSE
NATIONAL REFERENDUM. HE FELT SWISS MIGHT FIND IT
EASIER TO HELP LDCs ON DEBT. AGREED WITH COOPER ON
MACROECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF LDC DEBT AND NEED TO ACT.
HE SHARED COOPER VIEWS ON APPROACH TO COMMODITIES AND
STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF PRIVATE INVESTMENT. ON TRADE,
HE SAID SOME STIMULUS SHOULD BE GIVEN TO MTN.

12. NORDENFALK (SWEDEN) EXPRESSED SATISFACTION OVER
COOPER STATEMENT ON BASIS OF WHICH HE FELT HE NO LONGER
NEEDED TO URGE U.S. TO TAKE MORE ACTIVE APPROACH. NEW
U.S. ATTITUDE INDICATED SOLUTION WAS WITHIN REACH. HE
URGED ADDITIONAL FUNDS FOR IDA.

13. WELLENSTEIN (EC DEVELOPMENT CO-CHAIRMAN) ENDORSED
LOOK AT SUBSTANCE BEFORE PROCEDURE LEST G-8 AGAIN DRIFT
INTO TRAP OF AGREEING TO DISCUSSIONS WHERE WE DID NOT
HAVE ADEQUATE SUBSTANTIVE AMMUNITION. TRANSFER OF RE-
SOURCES, DEBT AND COMMODITIES WERE AREAS REQUIRING
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G-8 MOVEMENT. AFTER MOVING ON THESE WE COULD GET
SOMETHING LATE IN THE GAME ON THE ENERGY SIDE (E.G.
ON-GOING CONSULTATIONS). ON INVESTMENT WE NEEDED SOME-
THING THAT WOULD CREATE A BETTER ATMOSPHERE. HE ALSO
ARGUED THAT G-8 KEEP IN MIND NEED TO DO SOMETHING

SPECIAL FOR BLACK AFRICA FOR POLITICAL REASONS.

PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS

14. TIMING FOR RELAUNCHING CIEC

THERE WAS NO DISSENT FROM DUPUY'S SUMMATION THAT LATE APRIL SHOULD BE PROPOSED AS PERIOD FOR RELAUNCHING SUBSTANTIVE WORK ON CIEC.

15. LEVEL OF MEETING TO RELAUNCH

THERE WAS STRONG AGREEMENT WITH DUPUY'S CONCLUSION THAT G-8 SHOULD SEEK TO AVOID A MEETING AT SENIOR OFFICIAL LEVEL. DUPUY SAID CANADIANS FELT ESPECIALLY STRONGLY ABOUT THIS, GIVEN BLEAK EXPERIENCE LAST JULY. GROUP ALSO AGREED THAT WE SHOULD TRY TO RELAUNCH THROUGH MEETING OF 10 CO-CHAIRMEN. HOWEVER, DUPUY ANTICIPATED THAT PEREZ-GUERRERO WOULD STRONGLY CONTEST THIS POINT, BECAUSE HIS CONSTITUENCY WILL WANT SENIOR OFFICIALS MEETING (PERHAPS TO CREATE MAXIMUM TENSION BEFORE SUMMIT) AND P-G FEELS HIS LEADERSHIP HAS COME UNDER STRONG CHALLENGE. DUPUY OUTLINED AS POSSIBLE COMPROMISE FORMULA A RELAUNCHING BY TEN CO-CHAIRMEN WITH OTHER CONFERENCE MEMBERS STANDING IN THE WINGS. THIS WAS LAST MINUTE SUGGESTION WHICH DREW NO PARTICULAR REACTION.

16. POSSIBLE SENIOR OFFICIALS MEETING JUST BEFORE

MINISTERIAL

GROUP DID NOT EXCLUDE THIS POSSIBILITY AND THOUGHT IT MIGHT WELL FACILITATE WORK OF MINISTERIAL. MEETING AT THIS TIME, G-8 SENIOR OFFICIALS WOULD NOT FACE PROBLEM
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OF CONCLUDING THEIR MEETING WITHOUT HAVING CONCESSIONS

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EXTRACTED - A PROBLEM SENIOR OFFICIALS WOULD FACE AT ANY
EARLIER MEETING.

17. DATES FOR CONCLUDING MINISTERIAL

THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT MINISTERIAL SHOULD BE
HELD IN LATE MAY OR EARLY JUNE, AND DUPUY THOUGHT THIS
WOULD NOT CAUSE DIFFICULTIES WITH G-19. PROBLEMS HERE
WERE INTRA-G-8 AND INCLUDED FACT THAT JAPAN'S POLITICAL
CALENDAR MADE MAY INCONVENIENT SINCE MINISTERS HAD TO BE
PRESENT IN DIET SCHEDULED TO END MAY 28. EC HAD COUNCIL

SCHEDULED FOR MAY 31. COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE WAS SCHEDULED FOR JUNE 7. MATTER WAS LEFT THAT EC (BUTLER) WOULD IMMEDIATELY EXPLORE RESCHEDULING THEIR COUNCIL, AND IF THIS WAS AGREED, CANADIANS WOULD PROPOSE MAY 30/31 DATES TO P-G. ALTHOUGH FINAL DECISION ON DATES WILL OF COURSE REQUIRE CONFIRMATION BY ALL MEMBERS.

18. FIRMNESS OF PROPOSALS RE DATES
DUPUY RAISED QUESTION OF WHETHER EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO LEAVE SOME FLEXIBILITY IN DATES FOR MINISTERIAL. HIS CONCERN WAS THAT G-8 MIGHT SUBSEQUENTLY DECIDE THAT SUFFICIENT SUBSTANTIVE PROPOSALS COULD NOT BE PUT TOGETHER TO INSURE SUCCESSFUL CONFERENCE, BUT THAT FIRM AGREEMENT ON TIMETABLE WOULD HAVE LOCKED G-8 IN. AS ALTERNATIVE, HE SUGGESTED THAT CANADIAN/VENEZUELAN TIMETABLE BE SUBJECT TO RATIFICATION AT LATE APRIL MEETING RE-LAUNCHING CIEC. HE SUGGESTED THAT, AT THAT TIME, G-8 INDICATE TO G-19 THE "BALLPARK" RANGE OF LIKELY G-8 SUBSTANTIVE CONCESSIONS. IF THIS WERE REJECTED AS INTOLERABLE, G-8 WOULD SEEK TO WIND DOWN THE CONFERENCE. IF G-19 SIMPLY ACCEPTED TIMETABLE, THEY WOULD AT LEAST HAVE BEEN FOREWARNED. IN RESPONSE, COOPER NOTED THAT CONCEPT OF FLEXIBILITY ON DATES WAS NOT UNATTRACTIVE, BUT HE SAW NO CHANCE THAT G-19
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WOULD REALLY ACCEPT ANY PROSPECTIVE PACKAGE IN LATE APRIL. RATHER, THEY WOULD SEE ANY PROPOSED "BALLPARK" INDICATION AS OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE SUCH A PACKAGE AND TRY TO EXTRACT FURTHER CONCESSIONS. COOPER THOUGHT ANY SIGNALS TO G-19 ON PROSPECTIVE PACKAGE SHOULD BE HANDLED BILATERALLY (AS BUTLER HAD EARLIER SUGGESTED). HE POINTED OUT THAT THERE WOULD BE SUFFICIENT SUBSTANCE IN THE PACKAGE SO THAT THE G-19 COULD CALL CIEC A SUCCESS IF THEY WISHED TO. THE G-19 COULD ALSO ARGUE THAT IT FELL SHORT OF THEIR DEMANDS AND CALL IT A FAILURE. IT WAS A POLITICAL CHOICE OVER WHICH WE HAD LITTLE INFLUENCE. BUTLER AGREED WITH COOPER AND THOUGHT G-8 HAD TO RISK SETTING DATE. WELLENSTEIN ALSO AGREED, SINCE HE THOUGHT P-G WOULD REGARD DUPUY'S ALTERNATIVE AS "NOT SERIOUS". FURTHERMORE, WELLENSTEIN THOUGHT G-8 NOW CLEARLY KNEW WHAT THE G-19 REQUIRED ON THE KEY ISSUES.

19. DUPUY SAID THE FOREGOING COMMENTS MADE THE CANADIAN JOB EASIER, SINCE THEY DID NOT NEED TO WORK TO ESTABLISH A "SAFETY-NET" OR SIDE-DOOR OUT OF THE CONFERENCE. HE SAID THIS MEANT THAT THE G-8 WAS COMMITTED TO GO THROUGH TO THE BITTER END. THERE WAS NO DISSENT. HE COMMENTED THAT P-G, FOR HIS OWN REASONS, MIGHT HIMSELF SUGGEST SUCH A POSSIBLE ESCAPE

HATCH, AND IF SO HE CONCLUDED THE GROUP WOULD NOT WANT THE CANADIANS TO RESIST THIS. THERE WAS NO DISSENT ON THIS POINT.

20. USE OF COMMISSIONS OR CONTACT GROUPS

THE G-8 FELT THE COMMISSION MECHANISM SHOULD NOT BE ABANDONED. G-19 APPARENTLY WANTED TO DROP COMMISSIONS IN PART BECAUSE OPEC DOMINATION OF THIS MECHANISM WITHIN G-19 HAD DISCREDITED THE ARRANGEMENT. COOPER OBSERVED THAT WITHOUT THE COMMISSIONS, THE CONFERENCE

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WOULD LOSE ITS ENERGY FOCUS AND WOULD TEND TOWARD AN UNCTAD-TYPE ARRANGEMENT. OTHERS NOTED ADVANTAGES OF CO-CHAIRMAN MECHANISM AND WONDERED HOW CONTACT GROUPS COULD WORK WITHOUT PARENT BODIES. DUPUY'S CONCLUSION WAS THAT WE SHOULD SEEK TO USE EXISTING MACHINERY TO MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE, AND AVOID LENGTHY PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS OF SETTING UP NEW MECHANISMS. WELLENSTEIN REPORTED THAT AIT-CHAALAL HAD TOLD HIM THAT WHERE G-19 REFERRED TO CONTACT GROUPS, THEY REALLY MEANT CONTACT GROUPS IN THE CONTEXT OF COMMISSIONS. IF SO, CANADIAN TASK OF RETAINING COMMISSIONS MIGHT BE EASIER THAN ANTICIPATED.

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21. DURATION OF PERIOD BETWEEN RE-LAUNCHING OF
CONFERENCE AND CONCLUDING MINISTERIAL

WELLENSTEIN NOTED THAT CONFERENCE SHOULD BE SHORT
ENOUGH SO THAT IT WOULDN'T WAST TIME. NORDENFALK
(SWEDEN) POINTED OUT IT SHOULD BE LONG ENOUGH SO THAT
G-8 WOULD BE SEEN TO HAVE WORKED SERIOUSLY FOR SUCCESS-
FUL OUTCOME. DUPUY'S CONCLUSION WAS THAT ABOUT A
MONTH, MORE OR LESS, WOULD BE ABOUT RIGHT. NO ONE
DISSENTED FROM THIS.

22. RELATION OF SUMMIT TO CIEC MINISTERIAL

THIS WOULD NOT BE AN ISSUE WITH G-19, SINCE THEY HAD
WANTED SUMMIT TO COME FIRST (THOUGH P-G HAD INITIALLY
SOUGHT TO BRACKET SUMMIT WITH TWO MINISTERIALS).

23. BUTLER, CITING UK HOST COUNTRY ROLE, MADE CLEAR

THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO GET ACROSS TO G-19 THAT SUMMIT WAS A SMALL MEETING OF A FEW HEADS OF GOVERNMENT FOR INFORMAL DISCUSSION AND NOT A DECISION-MAKING BODY. HE ADDED THAT NON-SUMMIT MEMBERS OF G-8 SHOULD ALSO UNDERSTAND THIS AND THAT THERE WAS NO INTENTION TO TAKE DECISIONS WITHOUT THEM. G-8 SUMMIT NON-PARTICIPANTS AGREED WITH BUTLER AND CONFIRMED THAT THEY DID NOT EXPECT TO SEE DECISIONS EMERGING WHICH WOULD BIND THEM. OTHER PARTICIPANTS SAID THEY KNEW FROM EXPERIENCE THAT SUMMIT MEETINGS DID NOT LEND THEMSELVES TO DECISIONS. CANADIANS HAD THEMSELVES POINTED THIS OUT TO PEREZ-GUERRERO.

24. G-8 PREPARATIONS
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THE GROUP AGREED THAT CLOSE G-8 COORDINATION ON SUBSTANCE AS WELL AS PROCEDURE AND TACTICS WAS VERY IMPORTANT. A TENTATIVE DECISION WAS REACHED TO MEET AGAIN ON APRIL 6 (IMMEDIATELY AFTER AN EC COUNCIL - FOREIGN MINISTERS - ON WHICH CIEC DECISIONS ARE SCHEDULED TO BE TAKEN). THIS DATE IS TO BE CONFIRMED TO THE CANADIANS THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.

25 HANDLING OF PRESS

DUPUY SAID HE HAD SCHEDULED A MEETING WITH NEWSMEN IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE G-8. CANADIANS FELT THEY SHOULD DO THIS, SINCE G-19 HAD DECIDED ON A CALCULATED CAMPAIGN TO GAIN PRESS SUPPORT FOR THEIR CAUSE. DUPUY PROPOSED TO TAKE THE FOLLOWING LINE: G-8 HAD MET, HAD CONSIDERED PROGRAMS, PLANS, AND TIMING FOR THE BALANCE OF CIEC, AND WAS PROVIDING GUIDANCE TO THE CANADIAN CO-CHAIRMAN WHO WOULD BE MEETING WITH PEREZ-GUERRERO ON MARCH 7. DUPUY WOULD ADD THAT DELIBERATIONS HAD BEEN FRUITFUL, BUT HE WOULD NOT BE DRAWN OUT ON SPECIFICS, WHICH PRESS WOULD HAVE TO SEEK IN CARACAS AFTER CO-CHAIRMEN HAD MET. IN PRESS CONFERENCE ITSELF, DUPUY ADHERED TO THIS LINE.

26. INFO ADDRESSES WILL PLEASE NOTE THAT GUIDANCE ON CIEC MATTERS WILL BE PROVIDED FROM WASHINGTON. ACCORDINGLY, THEY SHOULD CONSIDER FOREGOING REPORT AS FOR THEIR INFORMATION ONLY.
TURNER

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